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An Affect Theory of Social Exchange1
Edward J. Lawler
Cornell University
This article develops a theory that explains how and when emotions,
produced by social exchange, generate stronger or weaker ties to
relations, groups, or networks. It is argued that social exchange
produces positive or negative global feelings, which are internally
rewarding or punishing. The theory indicates that social units (re-
lations, groups, networks) are perceived as a source of these feelings,
contingent on the degree of jointness in the exchange task. The
jointness of the task is greatest if (1) actors find it difficult to dis-
tinguish their individual effects on or contributions to solving the
exchange task (nonseparability) and (2) actors perceive a shared
responsibility for success or failure at the exchange task. The theory
explicates the effects of different exchange structures on these con-
ditions and, in turn, on cohesion and solidarity. Implications are
developed for network-to-group transformations.
This article proposes an affect theory of social exchange. The purpose is
to incorporate emotions as an explicit, central feature of social exchange
processes. The article accomplishes this by (1) conceptualizing individual
actors as emoting as well as cognizing, feeling as well as thinking, (2)
treating emotions as internal reinforcements or punishments, and (3) an-
alyzing how individuals’ relational and group attachments are connected
to their emotional experiences in social exchange. The theory moves be-
yond the traditional Skinnerian foundation (Homans 1961; Emerson
1972a) of exchange theory, as well as its more recent rational choice var-
1 This article was conceived while I was a fellow at the Center for Advanced Study
of the Behavioral Sciences in 1996–97. I gratefully acknowledge the financial support
provided by National Science Foundation during that year (grant no. SBR-9022192).
The empirical work that stimulated many of these ideas was also supported by the
NSF (SES 9222668 and SBR 9614860). Shane Thye, Lisa Troyer, and Jeongkoo Yoon
provided valuable comments on an earlier version. The article also benefited from
comments of members of the Iowa Theory Workshop. Direct correspondence to Ed-
ward J. Lawler, School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University, Ithaca,
New York 14853. E-mail: ejl3@cornell.edu
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iants (Cook and Whitmeyer 1992). It argues that emotions produced by
exchange structures and processes are critical to an understanding of how
and when social exchanges promote or inhibit solidarity in relations or
groups.
Social exchange is conceptualized as a joint activity of two or more
actors in which each actor has something the other values. The implicit
or explicit task in exchange is to generate benefit for each individual by
exchanging behaviors or goods that actors cannot achieve alone (Thibaut
and Kelley 1959; Homans 1961; Emerson 1972b). The affect theory of
social exchange expands the domain of exchange theorizing in two main
ways. First, exchange outcomes—rewards and punishments—are con-
strued as having emotional effects that vary in form and intensity. When
exchanges occur successfully, actors experience an emotional uplift (a
“high”), and when exchanges do not occur successfully, they experience
emotional “downs” (Lawler and Yoon 1996). Mild everyday feelings, there-
fore, are intertwined with exchange. Positive emotions include excitement,
pleasure, pride, and gratitude, and negative emotions include sadness,
shame, and anger. Second, social exchange is a quintessential joint activity,
but the nature and degree of jointness varies. Interdependencies embedded
in exchange structures determine the jointness of the exchange task. My
theory argues that, contingent on the exchange structure, emotions or
feelings from exchange influence how actors perceive and feel about their
shared activity, their relation, and/or their common group affiliations.
With higher degrees of jointness, the emotions experienced by actors in
exchange should make the relational or group context more salient as a
target for cognitions and feelings. Emotions, in this sense, contribute to
the “objectification” of relations and groups (Berger and Luckmann 1966;
Collins 1981).
The affect theory steps off from and extends the “theory of relational
cohesion” developed and tested in a series of experiments over the last
10 years (Lawler and Yoon 1993, 1996, 1998; Lawler, Thye, and Yoon
2000). The focus of this work was understanding the development of
commitment to exchange relations and, in particular, the effects of re-
peated exchange among the same actors. Several experiments clearly dem-
onstrate that repeated exchange with the same others generate positive
emotions that, in turn, promote perceived cohesion and commitment be-
havior (e.g., staying in the relation, providing unilateral gifts). A recent
study shows further that an uncertainty-reduction process operates dis-
tinct from and independent of the emotional-affective process, suggesting
dual processes for emotion and uncertainty reduction (Lawler et al. 2000).
My affect theory of social exchange focuses exclusively on the emotional/
affective process in order to broaden and deepen theorizing of the emo-
tional effects of exchange.
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Lawler and Thye (1999) recently showed the variety of roles emotions
can play in social exchange. Emotions are an integral part of the normative
context of exchange and often managed carefully by actors (Hochschild
(1979, 1983). In fact, emotion management accounts for why emotions
are often hidden from view in social exchange contexts and, for that
matter, other task-oriented, instrumental settings. Power or status differ-
ences are known to generate different emotions (Kemper 1978; Ridgeway
and Johnson 1990) and to have important effects on the interaction of
low- and high-status or power actors (Lovaglia and Houser 1996; Willer,
Lovaglia, and Markovsky 1997). Emotions are subtle signals to actors
about their own responses in interaction—as shown by affect control
theory (Heise 1979)—and when expressed, they provide information on
the intentions or orientation of others (Frank 1988). The affect theory of
social exchange complements these other approaches. It analyzes how
actors experience, interpret, and respond to their own emotions and feel-
ings produced by successful or unsuccessful exchange efforts; and, it aims
to explicate a causal process through which the emotions generate order
and solidarity at the relational, group, or network level.
Two interrelated questions are posed by the theory: (1) Under what
structural conditions will exchange produce emotions and feelings? (2)
Under what conditions will this emotion be attributed to social units
(relations, groups, organizations) and, therefore, generate collectively ori-
ented behavior? The core idea of the proposed theory can be expressed
as follows (see Lawler and Thye 1999, pp. 237–38): Structural interde-
pendencies among actors produce joint activities that, in turn, generate
positive or negative emotions; these emotions are attributed to social units
(relationships, networks, groups) under certain conditions, thereby pro-
ducing stronger or weaker individual-to-collective ties; and the strength
of those group ties determines collectively oriented behavior, such as pro-
viding unilateral benefits, expanding areas of collaboration, forgiving pe-
riodic opportunism, and staying in the relationship despite alternatives.
The following pages explain how the theory relates to extant exchange
theory and research.
BACKGROUND
Exchange theory assumes that actors face substantial degrees of ambiguity
and uncertainty—about what potential partners value, the utility of dif-
ferent exchanges to them, and what exchanges are being made between
others in the exchange network (see Molm and Cook 1995). Social
exchange is essentially about how actors jointly deal with and respond
to these uncertainties and ambiguities. It has been theorized that exchange
American Journal of Sociology
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theory’s actors respond both to past rewards, costs, and punishments and
also to anticipated future rewards, costs, and punishments (Molm and
Cook 1995), that is, they are both backward looking and forward looking
(Macy 1993). However, they are not necessarily fully rational profit max-
imizers (see Molm and Cook 1995). The goal of the actors is to generate
more valued goods, profit, and utility than they currently have, which
makes it possible for them to consummate exchanges that provide each
with more benefit than otherwise, but that are suboptimal (e.g., Macy
1993).2
Given the uncertainty built into social exchange contexts, actors face
serious, irresolvable information deficits. Such conditions should enhance
the emotional reactions when they succeed or fail at using exchange op-
portunities to deal with these uncertainties. Classic exchange theorists
attributed some import to emotions through concepts such as sentiment
(Homans 1961), comparison level (Thibaut and Kelley 1959), and intrinsic
attraction (Blau 1964), but emotions were subsidiary and undertheorized.
In the last 30 years, however, emotion as a relevant phenomenon to
exchange theorizing has receded further into the background. This is in
part due to Emerson’s seminal theoretical work (1972a, 1981). He elab-
orated and strengthened the operant/reinforcement foundation for
exchange and made social structures (networks) the central problem, but
in the process rendered emotions epiphenomenal or irrelevant. A similar
trend is evident in the work of Thibaut and Kelley. They gave more
attention to emotional aspects of exchange in their early work (1959) than
in their later elaboration, where cognition became more central (Kelley
and Thibaut 1978).
In contemporary exchange theorizing, individual actors are assumed to
be not only self-interested but also unemotional or emotionally vacuous
(Lawler and Thye 1999). This metatheoretical theme has reached its zenith
in theory and research on exchange networks, from that of Emerson and
his colleagues (Cook and Emerson 1978; Cook et al. 1983), to that of
Markovsky, Willer, and their colleagues (Markovsky et al. 1988, 1993;
2 Among economic theories or perspectives, social exchange theory is closest to trans-
actions-cost economics (Williamson 1981, 1985; North 1990). Williamson (1985) and
North (1990) assume bounded-rational actors, who are “intendedly rational” but im-
perfectly so, and who contract with one another to deal with uncertainties. When
transactions are frequent, transaction-specific assets tend to emerge, and thereby gen-
erate “bilateral trading” relationships (Williamson 1985, p. 30) or “personalized
exchange” (North 1990). My affect theory helps explain such emerging relationships,




Skvoretz and Willer 1993; Willer et al. 1997).3 Emerson’s reorientation
of exchange theory toward networks of relations rather than isolated
dyads stimulated a vast and impressive corpus of theory and research.
That research shows in detail how exchange networks affect the distri-
bution of rewards across individuals in different positions (Molm and
Cook 1995) and also how actors’ choice of partner among a set of exchange
opportunities generates some exchange relations and not others (e.g., Cook
et al. 1983; Markovsky et al. 1988; Skvoretz and Willer 1993; Friedkin
1992).
Rational choice and reinforcement processes are the micromediating
mechanisms in contemporary exchange theorizing. The effects of network
structures on action (strategy) are through either (1) the rational, dispas-
sionate choices made by actors about who to exchange with and about
what constitutes acceptable terms to offer (Willer and Anderson 1981) or
(2) the reinforcement contingencies developed over time in the exchange
process (Macy 1993; Molm 1987, 1994; Molm and Cook 1995). Cognitive
constructs about payoffs and incentives operate as an adjunct to these
(see Cook and Whitmeyer 1992). Risk and trust are especially prominent
in exchange theorists’ effort to address departures from strict reinforce-
ment or rational choice processes and to refine or qualify structural pre-
dictions (Molm 1994, 1997). Recently, some work by network exchange
theorists has included emotions as well as cognitions (Willer et al. 1997).
My affect theory proposes a third micromediating mechanism that pulls
elements from both a rational choice and reinforcement perspective. It is
informed by the larger psychological and sociological literature on emo-
tions, in particular the work of Collins (1981), Kemper (1978, 1987), Weiner
(1985), and Izard (1991). Emotions are defined as positive or negative
evaluative states with physiological and cognitive components (Lazarus
1984; Kemper 1978; Izard 1991; Clore 1994). Emotions may be transitory
or enduring, objectless or object focused, and of varying intensity. For
our purposes, I distinguish emotion and sentiment. Emotions are global
or specific, transitory feelings—positive or negative—that constitute an
internal response to an event or object (Weiner 1986; Frijda 1993; Kemper
1978).4 Sentiments are enduring affective states or feelings about one or
3 Research on equity and justice includes stronger emotional features than found in
the exchange-network tradition, but emotions enter primarily as mediators of behav-
ioral reactions to inequity. Sociological approaches emphasize cognitive models that
analyze justice judgments or evaluations (Hegtvedt and Markovsky 1995).
4 Clore et al. (1987) distinguish emotions based on three types of cognitive focus giving
rise to them: events, actions of agents, or aspects of objects. Events generate pleasure/
displeasure; agents approval/disapproval; and objects liking/disliking. Social exchange,
in these terms, is an event giving rise to pleasure or displeasure. This is generally
consistent with my affect theory of exchange.
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more social objects. Relations and groups are social objects, as are self
and other. Sentiments link emotions (feelings) to social units (Gordon
1981). This relational aspect of sentiments is drawn from Homans (1961),
leaving behind his behaviorist slant.
Following Weiner (1985), my affect theory distinguishes global emotions
and feelings from those that are specific and focused on a given social
object (specific emotions). Global emotions are “primitive” and have am-
biguous sources. Specific emotions are attached to or associated by the
actors with particular objects. A goal here is to theorize the link of every-
day emotions that are global and transitory to the more enduring affective
sentiments about social objects such as relationships, groups, and net-
works. A key theoretical question is When does social exchange lead actors
to associate global emotions with specific social objects—such as self, other,
a relationship, or group—and, as a result, develop more enduring positive
or negative feelings about those social objects? Research documents that
social exchange produces global feelings of satisfaction or dissatisfaction
(Molm 1994; Lawler and Thye 1999). The affect theory assumes that actors
are motivated to interpret such emotions and theorizes that jointness
of the exchange activity points them in the direction of social units.
In the following section, I present core assumptions of the theory,
a conceptual framework connecting different emotions to different
social objects (e.g., self, other, social unit), and a set of testable
propositions.
THE AFFECT THEORY
The affect theory of social exchange articulates general theoretical prin-
ciples that are intended to apply to a wide range of contexts—for example,
pleasantries or compliments by acquaintances, support or advice among
coworkers, information flows (gossip) among organizations, contracting
between firms and suppliers or between labor and management, and trad-
ing relations among nations. The theory assumes a network context with
three or more actors who have an opportunity to exchange valued be-
haviors, goods, or outcomes. Exchanges are dyadic and dyads are “con-
nected”; that is, exchange in a given dyad affects or is affected by ex-
changes in one or more other dyads (Emerson 1972b, 1981). The individual
actors make decisions about whether to exchange, with whom to
exchange, and under what terms. They do this repeatedly over time with
the same others, because the network structure creates recurring oppor-
tunities or constraints on who can exchange with whom. As implied, the
focus is exchanges that are ongoing, recurring, and subject to renegotiation
Affect Theory
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“at will,” meaning that “spot” exchanges among strangers or buyers/sellers
in a market are excluded from the scope of this theoretical analysis.
Theoretical Assumptions
There are five foundational assumptions of the affect theory of social
exchange:
Assumption 1.— Social exchange produces global emotions or feelings,
along a positive-to-negative dimension.
Assumption 2.—Global emotions from social exchange are internal
(self) reinforcing or punishing stimuli.
Assumption 3.—Actors strive to reproduce global positive emotions
and avoid global negative emotions experienced as a result of social
exchange.
Assumption 4.—The global emotions produced by social exchange trig-
ger cognitive efforts to understand the sources or causes of global feelings;
more specific emotions, tied to social objects, result from this attribution
process.
Assumption 5.—In the case of joint tasks, such as social exchange,
actors interpret and explain their global feelings partly with reference to
social units (e.g., relations, networks, or groups).
The five assumptions are informed by recent theory and research on
commitment in exchange (Lawler and Yoon 1993, 1996, 1998; Lawler and
Thye 1999; Lawler et al. 2000) and serve as the backdrop for propositions
of the affect theory of social exchange. Each assumption is discussed
below.
Global emotions or feelings essentially involve “feeling good” or “feeling
bad” (Russell, Weiss, and Mendelsohn 1989). These are immediate, in-
ternal, involuntary events produced by the results of an exchange process
(Weiner 1985). If exchange is consummated successfully, individuals feel
good about solving a task; if the exchange is unsuccessful, they feel bad
about not solving it (assumption 1). This general idea receives consistent
empirical support in research on exchange (Molm 1991; Lawler and Yoon
1996; Lawler et al. 2000). “Feeling good” and “feeling bad” can be con-
strued as special classes of reward and punishment, both internal and
self-induced (Bandura 1997) (assumption 2). Bandura has used the term
“self-reinforcement” to distinguish such internal stimuli from those that
are external to the actor and also to make the point that these are ana-
lytically independent from other forms of reinforcement and punishment.
Emotions are motivating because “feeling good” is positively valued in
itself and “feeling bad” is negatively valued in itself. Izard (1991, p. 43)
states “once an emotion is activated, whether by sensory data (e.g., pain)
or by cognitive processes (e.g., appraisal, attribution), even if it is a re-
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sponse to an event, it then becomes an organizing and driving force in
subsequent thought and action” (assumption 3). Emotions are responses
to stimuli but also stimuli that cause other responses. Many psychologists
have argued or shown that emotions are based on cognitive apprais-
als of some minimal sort (Lazarus 1984; Clore et al. 1987) and also that
they generate further cognitive appraisal through which actors understand
and interpret the connections between their feelings and their experiences.
Global feelings from exchange provide actors “a read” on their
own responses (see Heise [1979] for a related idea), but the vagueness of
these global emotions is a stimulus for cognitive-interpretive work
(assumption 4).5
Weiner’s (1986) attribution theory of emotion provides a framework for
understanding why global emotions generate cognitive-interpretive pro-
cesses. In Weiner’s (1986) theory, “primitive” emotions are global responses
to the outcomes of an interaction—that is, they are “outcome dependent.”
Such emotions are not based on interpretations or attributions—that is,
they are “attribution independent.” Primitive, global emotions can be con-
strued as internal, first-level, involuntary responses, felt and perceived by
the actors but sufficiently ambiguous to motivate an attribution process
(Weiner 1986). More specific emotions, such as gratitude/anger toward
the other or pride/shame in self are a result of efforts to interpret the
source or cause of such global emotions. Thus, whereas global emotions
are stimulus based and not under the control of the actor, they unleash
an attribution process that generates more specific, object-focused emo-
tions (Weiner 1986). This is a key point of the affect theory of exchange,
and I return to it later.
Social units—relations and networks—are potential objects or targets
of the global emotions. Assumption 5 indicates that the jointness of
exchange tasks leads actors to target social units in their interpretation
of the source of global emotions. If positive global emotions are attributed
to social units, they should develop stronger affective attachments to the
targeted relations or structures; if negative ones are attributed to social
units, weaker affective attachments should form.
The five assumptions constitute a single, unified package that suggests
how emotions generated by exchange may produce stronger affective at-
tachments to relevant social units. The interrelation of the assumptions
5 The standard view of exchange theorists is that emotions do not provide new infor-
mation beyond what is contained in the contingencies of reward and punishment, i.e.,
they are epiphenomenal and lack stimulus properties themselves. If emotions are self-
reinforcing (or self-punishing) events, however, emotional effects may add to objective,
extrinsic rewards in exchange, compensate for less-than-adequate rewards, or even
substitute for extrinsic rewards.
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is diagrammed in figure 1. Some links are analytic (definitional), and others
are synthetic (propositional).
The fundamental implication of the assumptions, as a whole, is that
positive emotions produced by exchange should increase solidarity effects
on relations and groups, and negative emotions should decrease solidarity
effects (Cook and Emerson 1984; Kollock 1994; Lawler and Yoon 1996;
Lawler and Thye 1999; Lawler et al. 2000). Solidarity is defined here as
the strength and durability of person-to-group and person-to-person re-
lations (Parsons 1951; Hechter 1987). Behavioral manifestations or indi-
cators of solidarity include the following: (1) Expanding areas of collab-
oration among actors (i.e., adding new exchange domains), even though
these make actors more dependent on each other and more vulnerable to
opportunism. (2) Exchanging unilateral benefits (e.g., gifts) that, when
provided, have no explicit demand for or expectation of reciprocity. (3)
Accepting more incomplete contracts, that is, ones with more ambiguities,
looser accountability rules, and fewer safeguards. (4) Forgiving costly
behaviors or isolated instances of opportunism. (5) Remaining in an ex-
isting relation or group despite equal or better alternatives elsewhere. To
the degree that such behaviors occur, the social unit in question has taken
on expressive value in itself. Emotional processes, in this sense, are a key
foundation for microsocial orders.6
Emotion and Social Objects
The theory connects the joint task of exchange with a social unit. The
social unit is a social object that is real to actors (Berger and Luckmann
1966). To theorize the connections of the joint task and emotions directed
at a social unit, we need a simple framework to identify the main social
objects in exchange and the emotions likely to be associated with each
object. Four social objects are assumed: (a) task, (b) self, (c) other, and (d)
social unit. The task is embedded in the form of exchange or exchange
structure. The most fundamental structures identified by exchange-
network theorists are productive, negotiated (restricted), nonnegotiated
(reciprocal), and generalized (see Ekeh 1974; Emerson 1981; Molm 1994;
Molm and Cook 1995); each structure entails a somewhat different task,
which I analyze shortly. Self here refers to inferences from exchange about
oneself (i.e., situational self-evaluations). Other refers to inferences about
6 In a recent study, Lawler et al. (2000) observed that an uncertainty-reduction process
operates independently of an emotional/affective process to produce cooperation in an
N-person prisoner’s dilemma, whereas an emotional/affective process produces uni-
lateral gift giving. The implication is that some forms of solidarity-related behavior
may be generated by uncertainty reduction and others by emotion or affect.
Fig. 1.—Interrelation of assumptions
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the other person with whom one is attempting to exchange (i.e., situational
evaluations of other). Finally, the social unit is the bounded social entity
perceived by actors as the principal context for the exchange; this can be
an exchange relation, network, or group.
Table 1 presents a conceptual scheme tying different emotions to dif-
ferent objects. This scheme pulls ideas from a variety of psychological
theory (Larsen and Diener 1992), especially Weiner’s (1986) attribution
theory and Russell et al.’s (1989) “affect grid.” Feelings of pleasantness
or unpleasantness are the global emotions. Pleasant feelings include in-
terest (i.e., excitement, enthusiasm) and joy (i.e., satisfaction, comfort,
relaxation); unpleasant feelings include stress or sadness (Russell et al.
1989). Interest and stress entail higher activation or arousal than joy or
sadness (Larsen and Diener 1992). Following Weiner (1986), these global
feelings form without much, if any, cognitive work, but they, in turn,
produce an attribution process designed to understand their causes—that
is, the global emotions are outcome dependent and attribution indepen-
dent (see Lazarus [1984] for related discussion).
The other emotions in table 1—those attached to self, other, or social
units—are mediated by the attribution process. On the positive side are
pride in self and gratitude toward the other; on the negative side are
shame in self and anger toward the other. If actors attribute pleasant
feelings from the exchange task to their own behavior, they feel pride; if
they attribute pleasant feelings to the other, they feel gratitude toward
that other. If the unpleasant feelings from failure at the exchange task
are attributed to self, shame is the likely emotion; if it is attributed to the
other, anger is the likely emotion. In some contexts, emotional ambivalence
may occur, involving a complex mixture of pride and shame toward self
or anger and gratitude toward the other. In other contexts, certain emo-
tional responses may be dominant features of the situation (Scheff 1990).
Attributions to social units entail tacit or explicit relational/group affili-
ations, and the relevant emotions are termed affective attachment or de-
tachment (alienation).
Attribution research reveals a tendency toward self-serving (hedonistic)
attributions; that is, individuals tend to attribute good events or behavior
internally and bad events externally (to the other or situation; see Weiner
1985). In social exchange, individuals therefore may give themselves more
credit for positive feelings from exchange and the other more blame for
negative feelings from failure to exchange. The mutual crediting-of-self
for pleasant results and blaming-of-other for unpleasant results can be
construed as a significant threat to exchange relations. The attribution of
positive emotion to social units may counter this threat and mitigate
“social order” problems implicit in self-serving (hedonistic) biases in at-
tribution processes. The attribution of negative emotion to the social unit
American Journal of Sociology
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TABLE 1
Emotions Directed at Each Object
Valence of Emotion
Social Object Positive Negative
Task . . . . . . . . . . Pleasantness Unpleasantness
Self . . . . . . . . . . . Pride Shame
Other . . . . . . . . Gratitude Anger
Social unit . . . Affective attachment Affective detachment
may promote the preservation of exchange relations by reducing mutual
shame in self and anger toward each other.
Attribution theory in psychology has focused almost exclusively on the
inferences made about a person from that person’s individual behavior
(Kelley 1967; Weiner 1985). In attribution terms, ascribing emotions to
relations or groups entail a situational attribution. The contrast of dis-
positional (internal to the person) versus situational (external to the person)
attributions has framed and organized nearly all work under the rubric
of “attribution theory” (Hewstone 1989). Situational attributions include
attributions of an actor’s behavior to chance, to luck, to a task, to a
relationship with another, or to larger groups or organizations. This un-
differentiated and open-ended notion glosses over and conflates important
features of the situation. Moreover, the dispositional (internal) and situ-
ational (external) dichotomy breaks down in group or interaction settings
where the tasks accomplished by actors are joint ones and where their
individual contributions are difficult to distinguish or separate (see Hew-
stone [1989] for a similar view and for relevant empirical evidence). This
makes the attribution of individual emotions to social units an important
issue in interaction settings.
I argue that—because global emotions are valued, self-reinforcing (or
self-punishing) stimuli, yet not controlled by those who feel them—actors
attempt to understand and control underlying situational conditions or
causes. This implies a more fine-grained, nuanced understanding of the
situational correlates of feelings than that suggested by the standard in-
ternal-external dichotomy assumed in attribution theory and research. A
plausible conjecture is that social relations and groups offer attractive
explanations for actors (whether accurate or not), because social units are
often stable features of the situation. I posit a social-unit attribution pro-
cess whereby actors attempt to understand the social foundations of global
emotions from the task.7
7 In the attribution literature, some attention has been accorded inferences about in-




The object-emotion links raise several questions. What features of joint
exchange tasks set the stage for social-unit (relational or group) attribu-
tions for emotions? How do various types of exchange structure (e.g.,
negotiated vs. generalized) affect these features of the task and therefore
the emotion produced? What are the conditions under which social unit
attributions for the emotion are likely to override the tendency toward
self-serving attributions of credit/blame for success/failure at the exchange
task? Given multiple social units, which ones are most likely to be targets
for emotional attributions? These questions organize the propositions of
the affect theory.
Properties of joint exchange tasks.—A joint task is one that can only
be completed with one or more others. None of the actors can complete
the task alone and, therefore, a condition of interdependence is assumed.
How the individual behaviors or contributions to the task effort are con-
nected or put together can vary considerably. The affect theory of social
exchange emphasizes two fundamental dimensions of jointness. First, in
joint tasks, actors’ individual contributions are not as easily identifiable
or separable from the contributions of others than in other tasks. Non-
separability is a structural dimension of joint tasks. This property was
used by Williamson (1985, pp. 245–47) to theorize what organizations of
labor will produce relational-team governance structures with a “we are
all in this together” theme. Second, joint tasks make it difficult for actors
to give total credit to themselves for positive feelings from task success
or total blame to the other for negative feelings from task failure. Their
interdependence with one or more others should lead them to not only
take account of the other’s role in task success but also to share credit
or blame. This means that joint tasks, such as exchange, have the potential
to promote a sense of shared responsibility for task success/failure and
the emotions that result.
Joint tasks that generate shared responsibility are also likely to generate
a sense of socially mediated self-efficacy—meaning that an individual’s
self-efficacy is tied to collective efficacy via a relation or group. Successful
exchange may foster a variety of efficacy-related perceptions: for example,
“We can do profitable work together,” “We can do things that I cannot
do alone or with others,” or “When we get together, things happen,” and
so on. These also reflect a sense of shared responsibility. Research dem-
onstrates that perceptions of self-efficacy produce positive emotions (joy,
elation, pride), and its absence produces negative emotions (sadness, de-
1989 for a review), but there is little research on attributional inferences about rela-
tionships or groups from social interaction. Some indications of this are found in work
on close relationships (see Duck 1988) and social identity (see Tajfel and Turner 1986).
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pression, shame) (Deci 1980; Izard 1991). Self-efficacy helps explain the
impact of shared responsibility on attachments to social units.
The properties of joint tasks are interwoven. The most fundamental
basis for perceptions of shared responsibility—and by implication socially
mediated self-efficacy—is how identifiable and distinctive individual con-
tributions are to the task. To the degree that each individual’s involvement
in, contributions to, or influence over the results of exchange are not clearly
distinguishable or separable, actors should perceive a joint, shared re-
sponsibility for success or failure at the exchange task. This reasoning
leads to two core propositions of the theory:
Proposition 1.—The greater the nonseparability of individuals’ impact
on task success or failure, the greater the perception of shared
responsibility.
Proposition 2.—The greater the perception of shared responsibility for
success/failure at a joint task, the more inclined actors are to attribute
resulting global and specific feelings to social units (i.e., relations, net-
works, or groups).
Exchange structure and emotion.—Exchange structures can increase or
decrease perceptions of shared responsibility, because of differences in the
nonseparability of individual task behaviors across structures. Sociological
theories of exchange distinguish four forms or types of exchange structure,
each entailing a distinct joint activity (see Emerson 1972b, 1981; Ekeh
1974; Molm 1994; Molm and Cook 1995). These are (a) productive
exchange, that is, coordinating efforts or combining resources to generate
a joint good; (b) negotiated exchange, that is, negotiating an explicit agree-
ment or the terms of a trade; (c) reciprocal exchange (sequential, often
tacit, giving of benefits across time) and (d) generalized exchange (pro-
viding unilateral benefits to one actor or member of a network or group
while receiving them from one or more other members; see Emerson 1981;
Molm and Cook 1995). Productive exchanges are actor-to-group and in-
volve a common target and source of benefit (i.e., the collective endeavor);
negotiated and reciprocal exchanges are actor-to-actor (i.e., direct
exchange); and generalized exchanges are indirect in that to whom an
actor gives benefit is not the same actor from whom he or she receive
benefit. These forms of exchange are diagrammed in figure 2.
Consider the example of scholarly exchanges among three professors:
A, B, C. If A and B give each other a paper they are working on and
agree to have lunch to discuss each other’s work, this is a negotiated
exchange in which the terms are the time and care devoted to each other’s
paper. Coauthorship by any two or all three, in which each contributes
specific talents or knowledge, illustrates a productive exchange—that is,
they give and receive from the collective endeavor or product. A reciprocal
exchange would occur if A asks and receives feedback from B on a paper
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Fig. 2.—Forms of social exchange; A, B, and C refer to group actors and G to group
product (see Molm 1994).
with no expectation that B will comment on one of A’s paper, but later
on B asks for and receives comments on a paper from A. An indirect,
generalized exchange would occur if over time A comments on B’s paper,
B comments on C’s paper, and C comments on A’s paper. Each person
receives comments on a paper from some other and each person gives
comments to another, but the actors in these pairs are not the same per-
sons. The affect theory of social exchange sheds light on when and how
these different forms of exchange generate (1) global feelings of pleas-
antness or unpleasantness, (2) perceptions of shared responsibility, and (3)
an attribution process generating affective attachments to social units.
The comparison of different structures of exchange is a unique aspect
of the affect theory. Recent theorizing and research on emotion and
exchange has focused on a single form of exchange structure. Tests of the
theory of relational cohesion have been conducted in negotiated exchange
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(Lawler and Yoon 1993, 1996, 1998), as have some initial tests of power
differences on emotions (Willer et al. 1997). Molm, Peterson, and Take-
hashi (1999) have shown corresponding effects on emotion in reciprocal
(nonnegotiated) exchange. Most recently, a study of productive exchange
in three-person groups demonstrates the effects of repeated success at
exchange on positive emotions and on group cohesion (Lawler et al. 2000).
The affect theory of social exchange is the first attempt to theorize the
distinct emotional effects of different exchange structures.
Productive exchange is a “conjunctive” task, that is, one with a single
socially produced event or good that occurs only if members perform
certain behaviors (Molm 1994; Molm and Cook 1995; Lawler et al. 2000).
The potential for productive exchange exists when cooperation provides
actors the greatest individual benefits and the main issue is coordination.
The prototype is a partnership in which two or more actors bring some-
thing specific to a collective endeavor and the whole of what they produce
is greater than the sum of the parts. Examples of this type of partnership
include a nuclear family eating a meal together, three universities com-
bining resources to initiate a new educational program that none can
launch alone or in conjunction with just one other, three scholars co-
authoring a paper, and several neighbors organizing a night watch in
response to a series of burglaries in the area.
Productive exchange entails higher degrees of interdependence than
other forms of exchange, an incentive structure that not only favors co-
operation and exchange, but also produces coordination problems that
make exchange problematic (see Lawler et al. 2000). It is the most group-
oriented form of exchange and likely to have the strongest emotional/
affective consequences for cohesion and solidarity (see Lawler et al. [2000]
for supporting evidence). Productive exchange tasks have the greatest
degree of nonseparability, produce the greatest degree of shared respon-
sibility, and generate the strongest feelings of pleasantness in the case of
success at exchange, and unpleasantness in the case of failure. Other
exchange structures undercut these effects due to countervailing negative
feelings or a smaller sense of shared responsibility.
The group product can be a private good shared only by members of
the group or a public good that has the potential for free riding. In the
private-goods case, contributions by all are necessary for the benefit to
occur to any of them, and actors know when someone fails to contribute
and who it was. In the public-goods case, there is a threshold at which
the good is produced and less, if any, knowledge of who fails to contribute.
All things being equal, jointly produced private goods will generate a
stronger sense of shared responsibility than jointly produced public goods
because of the free-rider problem in the latter (Lawler et al. 2000).
Negotiated exchange involves an explicitly contractual agreement in
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which actors agree to terms of a trade and these agreements are binding.
Conceptually, the group-level outcomes (G) in negotiated exchange are
the average of each negotiator’s (A, B) offers or demands; that is, A
. Because the exchange is negotiated explicitly and each actor’sBp G
consent is necessary for the exchange to be consummated, the jointness
of the activity is highly salient and the sense of shared responsibility should
be relatively strong. The behaviors or contributions of actors to the task
have both separable (i.e., distinct offers by each) and nonseparable (i.e.,
the conjoint effects of their offers) features. Thus, the process specified
by propositions 1 and 2 should occur, but not be as strong as in the case
of productive exchange.
Research on negotiated exchange has revealed strong support for the
notion that exchange produces positive emotions (pleasure-satisfaction)
and indicates this is more likely under equal than unequal structural
power (Lawler and Yoon 1993, 1996, 1998). The implication is that suc-
cessful exchange under equal power tends to generate a greater sense of
shared responsibility for the exchange and for the positive feelings it
produces. Under unequal power, actors tend to blame each other for
failure, generating mutual anger; if agreements occur, positive feelings are
reduced by the fact that advantaged and disadvantaged actors experience
differing degrees of pleasure-satisfaction (Lawler and Yoon 1993; Willer
et al. 1997). Self-serving attributions should be stronger in unequal power
than equal-power relations.
Negotiated exchange has the potential to produce conflicting emotions
or emotional ambivalence, due to the fact that its mixed-motive character
is salient. For example, pride in self for successful exchange may be com-
bined with some “shame in self” for not reaching an even better agreement;
gratitude toward the other for what he or she gave occurs along with
some anger that they did not give more. In the case of failure to exchange,
attribution theories suggest that anger toward the other may exceed the
shame to self. Importantly, if exchanges are explicit, offers can be com-
pared easily, and actors are sensitive to departures from equality. Suc-
cessful exchanges may produce the global ups or downs, as predicted by
the theory, but emotional ambivalences are likely to reduce the effects of
these emotions on group relations. For these reasons, the sense of shared
responsibility should be lower in negotiated than in productive exchange.
Reciprocal exchange involves sequential, nonnegotiated, unilateral re-
wards that are provided without an explicit expectation of reciprocity
(Molm 1994; Molm et al. 1999). Tacit, informal understandings replace
the explicit agreements of negotiated exchange. Exchanging favors, as-
sisting with job tasks, invitations to dinner are all examples of reciprocal
exchange. Each actor benefits individually from what the other provides
them and, as in negotiated exchange, the effects of each actor are additive
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at the relational or group level. Providing benefits to another at a given
point in time creates an implicit obligation to reciprocate when asked,
but how, what, and when something is to be given in return is left open.
Reciprocal exchange entails more uncertainty and risk than negotiated
exchange, and consequently trust is especially important here (Molm 1994;
Molm et al. 1999).
In reciprocal exchange, the contributions of each actor are separable
and distinguishable, given the time lapse between giving and receiving.
Therefore, perceptions of shared responsibility for the exchange should
not be as strong as for negotiated or productive exchange. The fact that
the nonseparability of individual contributions and shared responsibility
are lower than in negotiated exchange suggests that successful exchange
produces weaker positive emotions in the reciprocal case than in the
negotiated case. This is a paradoxical inference, because strong and close
relations tend to involve reciprocal exchange and, in fact, recent evidence
shows that commitment is greater in reciprocal than in negotiated
exchange relations (Molm et al. 1999).
The solution to this paradox lies in how global emotions are produced
in negotiated versus reciprocal exchange. In negotiated exchange, the re-
sult of an exchange process produces global emotions that are felt and
interpreted by actors. In reciprocal exchange, if A gives something of
value to B, B feels gratitude but gives nothing in return. Yet B can signal
the giver of positive future intent by expressing gratitude (see Frank 1988).
This acknowledgement affirms a common definition of the situation and
generates a measure of pride on the part of the giver—that is, a gift by
A produces an expression of gratitude by B that in turn generates pride
in A. Thus, giving behavior becomes important, not just because of future
receiving, but because giving itself produces an internal reward (pride)
mediated by the other’s immediate reaction. The exchange of benefits
itself produces little emotional response, because of the time lags between
giving and receiving, but the specific emotions expressed by the receiver
and felt by the giver should generate global feelings of pleasantness or
unpleasantness. In other words, emotions expressed as an immediate re-
sponse to a gift “complete” a joint action (gift by one, emotion expressed
by the other) similar to that which underlies negotiated exchange. Recip-
rocal exchange, therefore, should foster stronger perceptions of shared
responsibility than would be expected, based on the separability of in-
dividuals’ giving behavior, but still weaker than negotiated exchange.
Finally, generalized exchange is indirect rather than direct. Unilateral
benefits are provided to another, as in reciprocal exchange, but the giver
at time 1 receives a benefit from a different actor at time 2, for example,
A gives to B who gives to C who gives to A. The givers and receivers
do not directly exchange with one another, so the exchange has an im-
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personal character (see Molm and Cook 1995). The prototype is a chain
network in which there are unilateral flows of benefit, often forming a
closed circle—for example, analyses of the Kula Ring (Ekeh 1974). In a
group of scholars this pattern would foster a collegial, helpful environment
for each individual actor but not necessarily forge strong ties among any
particular subset of actors. Such collective effects indicate that generalized
exchange has an element of productive exchange. Like productive
exchange, interdependencies among the actors are high, and the coordi-
nation of their individual behaviors is a key problem. Yet, generalized
exchange entails separable individual contributions to the collective en-
deavor, and it is not likely to endogenously generate a strong sense of
shared responsibility for exchange. The collective or group effects occur
on an objective, but not a subjective, level.
The group-level effects of generalized exchange lead Ekeh (1974) to
argue that generalized exchange is a fundamental underpinning of social
order. It generates higher levels of group solidarity to the degree that
mutual trust is present among the actors, trust that others will “discharge
their obligations to the enrichment of society rather than for their exclusive
narrow self interest” (1974, p. 59). Such trust presupposes constraints from
a larger network of relationships; that is, it is relationally—rather than
transactionally—based.8 Ekeh argues that, in the case of direct exchange
(i.e., what he terms “restricted exchange”), a quid pro quo or transactional
mentality renders order and solidarity more brittle and tenuous. My ar-
gument is that indirect exchange relations are fragile because they do not
have the emotional/affective foundation that can develop in either pro-
ductive or direct forms of exchange. Indirect exchanges lack the inter-
personal component as well as an explicit or salient joint product.
Table 2 summarizes the comparisons between the forms of social
exchange. Three differences are important: (1) the degree of jointness in
the exchange task (i.e., nonseparability of individual behavior or contri-
butions); (2) the strength or intensity of the emotional response to success
or failure; and (3) whether actors are likely to perceive a shared respon-
sibility for the emotions produced by performance of the exchange task.
Productive exchange is highest on these dimensions, direct exchange (ne-
gotiated and reciprocal) second, and indirect (generalized) last. Three
propositions capture the main argument:
Proposition 3.—Productive exchange relations produce stronger global
8 It should be noted that Ekeh (1974) distinguishes several types of generalized
exchange. The form I refer to here is what Ekeh calls “chain generalized”; what I term
productive exchange is comparable to what Ekeh terms “group focused net generalized
exchange.”
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TABLE 2





Productive . . . High High High
Negotiated . . . Medium High Medium to high
Reciprocal . . . Low Medium to high Medium
Indirect . . . . . . Low Low Low
feelings and stronger perceptions of shared responsibility than direct or
indirect (generalized) exchange relations.
Proposition 4.—Direct exchange relations (negotiated and reciprocal)
produce stronger global feelings and stronger perceptions of shared re-
sponsibility than indirect (generalized) exchange.
Proposition 5.—Comparing direct forms of exchange, negotiated
exchange produces stronger global feelings and perceptions of shared re-
sponsibility, whereas emotional expressions in the exchange process have
these effects for reciprocal exchange.
To summarize, the theory shows why and how the emotional effects of
exchange vary across different exchange structures. In productive
exchange, the nonseparability of individual contributions and shared re-
sponsibility stand out, and thus, the corresponding emotions should be
felt more intensely, whether they are positive (in the case of success) and/
or negative (in the case of failure). Negotiated exchange leads to mutually
acknowledged agreements (or nonagreements) and, once again, jointness
should be highly salient; yet, negotiated exchange promotes a mixture of
positive and negative specific emotions about self and other, and indi-
vidual effects are more easily distinguishable than in productive exchange.
Reciprocal exchange, with the varied time lags between giving and re-
ceiving, has easily separable individual-level contributions, but in a com-
parable sense, shared responsibility is produced if there is an exchange
of expressed emotions around each unilateral gift. Shared responsibility
is structurally produced in negotiated exchange, whereas it is behaviorally
constructed in reciprocal exchange. In generalized exchange, the fact of
a joint task is not evident unless it is already established and then begins
to break down. A sense of shared responsibility would have to be produced
exogenously in generalized exchange, rather than through the endogenous
process of my affect theory.
Relational and group attributions of emotion.—Relational and group
attributions of emotion are a critical link between the global emotions
from exchange and solidarity behavior. Based on the theory, relational/
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group attributions are likely when (1) the exchange relations have a pro-
ductive form, (2) the results of exchange are jointly produced in such a
way that individual contributions or influences are not easily separable,
and (3) actors perceive a shared responsibility for the global emotions felt.
Relational or group attributions suppress self-serving attribution biases
under these conditions by promoting interconnections between individ-
uals’ sense of self-efficacy and their sense of collective efficacy; because
for actors, self-efficacy is mediated by the relation or group. Social-unit
attributions should be strongest when actors’ sense of self-efficacy from
the task is completely interwoven with their sense of collective efficacy,
as is likely under productive exchange. Higher interdependence connotes
a stronger structural link between self and collective efficacy; and if actors
perceive this, relational/group attributions should dominate self-serving
attributions. Proposition 6 states the main point, and proposition 7 pre-
dicts the ordering across exchange structures:
Proposition 6.—Relational and group attributions of emotions from
exchange are stronger to the degree that (1) the exchanges are productive
rather than direct or indirect, (2) the exchange task is joint (high non-
separability), and (3) the task creates perceptions of shared responsibility
for global emotions.
Proposition 7.—The strength of relational and group attributions for
global emotions is ordered as follows across the four forms of exchange:
productive 1 negotiated 1 reciprocal 1 generalized.
Molm et al.’s (1999) evidence that reciprocal exchange produces more
trust, commitment, and positive affect directed toward the exchange part-
ner than negotiated exchange could be construed as contrary to propo-
sition 7. The relevant social object in Molm’s research, however, is the
other person, rather than the social unit (relationship); and, in this context,
it makes sense that reciprocal exchange would produce emotion directed
toward the other person. The explicit jointness of the task in negotiated
exchange sets the stage for attributions to a larger social unit (in this case,
the exchange relation), without necessarily eliminating attributions to self
and other. Evidence from social-identity research reveals that perceptions
of a social unit (i.e., groupness) are not mere reflections of how particular
others in the situation are perceived, a major point also theorized by
George Herbert Mead (1934) in his classic analysis of generalized others.
My contention is that negotiated exchange is more likely to create a sense
of something larger, beyond the dyadic exchange, than is reciprocal
exchange. Cohesion and solidarity should be more impersonal in nego-
tiated exchange and more personal in reciprocal exchange.
Relational or group attributions generate important solidarity-related
consequences not only for global emotions but also for specific emotions
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directed at self and other. If self-serving attributions are dominant, emo-
tions directed at self and other are inversely related—that is, pride in self
is negatively correlated with gratitude toward the other. However, if re-
lational/group attributions are strong, pride in self and gratitude toward
the other are not zero sum; success at exchange increases both pride by
A and A’s gratitude toward B. Applied to negative emotions, person A
could experience both shame in self and anger toward B. Mutually felt
pride/gratitude builds and solidifies relationships, whereas mutually felt
shame/anger weakens or tears them apart (e.g., see also Scheff 1990).
To elaborate, consider two individuals, A and B, who are able to make
exchanges on a regular basis under the conditions of proposition 6. They
come to realize that they can accomplish something important together
which they each would have trouble accomplishing alone or with other
partners. Person A feels pride at solving the exchange problem with an-
other, and A also feels gratitude toward B for being a reliable partner in
their joint effort. The pride A feels takes no credit away from B and the
gratitude toward B takes no credit away from herself. The fact that each
can feel good about themselves (pride), about the other (gratitude), and
about their relationship stems from the interweaving of self and collective
efficacy. Thus, relational attributions of the global positive emotions es-
sentially foster a sharing of emotional benefits at the level of specific
emotions which, in turn, further strengthens attachments to the relevant
social unit.
The sharing of emotional benefits, however, does not fully generalize
to the “emotional costs” of joint failure. Given a perception of shared
responsibility for task failure, relational attributions lead actors to shift
some blame or anger to their relationship and away from each other,
thinking, for example: “Well, perhaps it’s not me, and it’s not him; we
just don’t hit it off or work together well” or “Well, we really blew it here
because we didn’t see eye to eye on the problem; we need to work on
this.” Relational effects occur but self-serving biases are not likely to be
suppressed to the same degree in the case of shared responsibility for
failure at the exchange task. Actors still are likely to feel more anger
toward the other than blame to oneself. The following proposition is
implied:
Proposition 8.—Relational/group attributions for positive emotions
from successful exchange eliminate self-serving biases and equally enhance
pride in self and gratitude toward the other; relational/group attributions
for negative emotions from failure to exchange reduce, but do not elimi-
nate, self-serving biases, such that the actor feels more anger toward the
other than shame in self.
Affective attachments.—The most fundamental solidarity effect of re-
lational/group attributions is to enhance or diminish actors’ affective at-
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tachment to the social unit, that is, person-to-group ties (Parsons 1951;
Tajfel and Turner 1986. Relational/group attributions for positive emotion
increase actors’ affective attachment to the social unit, whereas attribu-
tions for negative emotions foster affective detachment or alienation. Con-
ditions under which these effects occur can be developed from Weiner’s
(1985) attribution theory of emotions.
Weiner argues that causal attributions for behavior have emotional
effects on actors, depending on three conditions: (1) the locus of causality
(internal vs. external), (2) the perceived stability of the cause (i.e., its
persistence as a force), and (3) the degree that the cause is controllable
by anyone, not just the actors in question. He predicts different specific
emotions for each possible combination of these conditions. Of particular
relevance for the affect theory of social exchange, attributions of positive
acts by another produce gratitude if perceived as “controllable” by the
other (i.e., voluntary); whereas negative acts generate anger, if perceived
as controllable by the other. Furthermore, if the causes of the behavior
in question are stable, then reliable expectations of success or failure form
and these, in turn, produce feelings of hopefulness or hopelessness (Weiner
1985, p. 162). Stability and controllability suggest when affective attach-
ment or detachment is likely.
Social units are sources of stability and controllability. If a relation is
perceived as a stable source of positive feelings and also as enhancing
actors’ control over them, the positive impact on affective attachments
to that social unit should be stronger than otherwise. The role of socially
mediated self efficacy again is implied here. Negative feelings from
exchange should heighten affective detachment if the relation is perceived
as a stable source of negative feelings and if these are not controllable by
the actors.9 With repeated success at the exchange task, the actor becomes
more and more affectively attached to the relation, and the relation be-
comes a stronger object of positive value; with repeated failure, a de-
tachment process occurs and the relation loses positive value or becomes
an object of negative value. This leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 9.—Affective attachments to relations or groups will be
stronger if those social units are perceived as stable and controllable
sources of positive feelings from exchange; affective detachments (alien-
ation) from relations or groups will be stronger if these social units are
perceived as stable and uncontrollable sources of negative feelings.
9 Negative feelings under the control of the other (intentional) would generate strong
negative reactions to the other person, but not necessarily to the relation because
intentionality is not applicable to social units, as it is to individuals. At the relational
or group level, it is the lack of controllability and attendant hopelessness that is
important.
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Relations, Networks, and Group Formation
There are two social units of prime importance to the affect theory:
exchange relations and exchange networks. Relations are nested within
networks, and networks are a set of connected dyadic ties (Emerson 1981).
The theory shows how an exchange relation becomes a salient social unit
and an object of affective attachment. If this occurs, the exchange relation
takes on group properties (see Lawler and Yoon 1996). An important
question is When might the network take on group properties? Emerson
(1981) distinguished networks from groups but did not theorize the con-
nection. This leads me to ask a second question: If the network is a social
unit in the situation, will actors be attached more strongly to the subunit
(relation) or to the larger unit (network)? The affect theory of social
exchange can address these issues.
Network-to-group transformations.—With repeated exchange, one can
imagine a network evolving into a group, thereby becoming a source of
common identity for those in the network. Emerson distinguished two
fundamental types of network: positively connected and negatively con-
nected (Emerson 1972b, 1981; Molm and Cook 1995; Yamagishi, Gillmore,
and Cook 1988). In positively connected networks, exchange by A and B
increases the probability that they also exchange with others (C and D)
who are available to them; that is, the network contains mutually sup-
portive dyadic ties and incentives to interact with all those they are con-
nected to in the network. In negatively connected networks, the proba-
bility of exchange between A and B is negatively related to the probability
of exchange with others. These networks foster mutually exclusive dyadic
ties. The incentives are to find the best and most profitable tie among
those available. A comparison of positively and negatively connected net-
works has important implications for understanding when networks de-
velop group properties.
Positively connected networks should promote the diffusion of emotions
and feelings from one dyadic exchange relation to another. If actor A
experiences positive feeling in exchanges with B, then A should be more
likely to establish exchange relations with C, and experience similar pos-
itive feelings (Markovsky and Lawler 1994). This is suggested by a range
of evidence indicating that persons in a positive emotional state (i.e.,
feeling good) are more cooperative and more inclusive in their dealings
with others, even those who have no responsibility for the emotional state
(e.g., see Isen [1987] for a review). The implication is that dyadic exchange
in positively connected networks fosters affective attachments to the net-
work and to relations within it. Negative emotions also spread but produce
affective detachment from the network and its members. These effects
can be explained by the fact that positively connected networks produce
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a stronger sense of a collective endeavor, because there is essentially a
joint task at the network level that is activated by the spread of emotions
and feelings across dyadic exchanges. Thus, the emotional effects of
exchange within positively connected networks—whether the emotion is
positive or negative—foster awareness of the network as a social unit and
a propensity to perceive and act toward it as an object.
In negatively connected networks, positive emotions do not spread but
instead become relation specific, as pockets of relational cohesion develop
(Lawler and Yoon 1996). Dyadic relations are insulated from one another,
and there is little basis for the network to be perceived as a unit unto
itself or to develop grouplike properties. Negative emotions should gen-
erate a search for new partners or better deals and carry over from one
exchange opportunity to another. Thus, negatively connected networks
tend to fragment and break down into loosely connected or unstable
patterns of dyadic exchange. Here are the main propositions based on
this reasoning:
Proposition 10.—In positively connected networks, successful
exchange in dyads strengthens affective attachments to the network as
well as to particular exchange relations; whereas, in negatively connected
networks, successful exchange in dyads strengthens affective attachments
to exchange relations more than to the network.
Proposition 11.—In positively connected networks, repetitive
exchange transforms the network into a group with dense ties; whereas,
repetitive unsuccessful exchanges forestalls group formation and produces
a network with sparse and loosely-connected ties.
Nested social units.—The nesting of relations in networks, assumed by
network-exchange theories (Emerson 1981; Markovsky, Willer, and Patton
1988; Willer 1999), captures a fundamental feature of social life: People
generally interact as members of subunits nested within larger units, e.g.,
subgroups in a group, divisions in a corporation, departments in a uni-
versity, neighborhoods within a city. The affect theory can explain vari-
ation in the relative attachments to proximate social units or subunits
(e.g., exchange relations) and larger social units (e.g., the network). To
address this, ideas from two related theories are integrated, my own
choice-process theory of affective attachments (Lawler 1992, 1997), and
Collins’s (1975, 1981, 1989) theory of interaction ritual chains.
The main point of my (Lawler 1992, 1997) choice-process theory is that
people form stronger affective attachments to those social units that give
them the greatest sense of control (or self-efficacy). Having choices gives
people a sense of efficacy that, in turn, produces positive emotions which
are attributed to the social unit perceived as most responsible for their
choice opportunity. The prediction is that people tend to give credit to
the most immediate or proximal social unit for a sense of control or
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efficacy, but blame the more distant unit for the absence of choice and
efficacy (Lawler 1992). Collins’s (1981) theory of interaction ritual chains
argues that people who repetitively interact develop common foci and
common moods that symbolize their relationships or group memberships.
His theory predicts greater solidarity from repetitive joint activities to the
degree that the interaction engenders (1) common focus that actors rec-
ognize; (2) common feelings (uplift, confidence) that motivate action to-
ward that common focus; (3) a sense of a “shared reality” manifest in the
salience of common foci and the intensity of the emotional uplift. The
result, according to the theory, is that actors come to “feel like members
of a little group symbolized by whatever they focused on,” and they feel
a greater moral obligation to one another (Collins 1989, p.18).
Collins’s theory places an emphasis on person-to-person interaction and
argues that interpersonal “conversation” is the fountainhead of “emotional
energy” that people take from one situation (conversation) to another.
Emotional energy is a generalized motivational state involving feelings
of warmth and confidence, not unlike the global feelings of pleasantness
in the affect theory of social exchange or the “primitive emotions” of
Weiner’s (1986) theory. Repetitive interaction is the basis for solidarity at
the micro level because of the feelings that actors associate with the com-
mon effort. Both Collins and I reach the same conclusion—namely that
cohesion and solidarity is stronger in smaller face-to-face social units that
constitute the immediate focus of attention. This implies a tendency (all
other things equal) for exchange relations to be objects of stronger affective
attachment than the social units (networks, groups) in which they are
nested.
The rationale for this is that the local social unit—whether a relation
in a network or a group in an organization—has an “interaction advan-
tage.” This is where joint tasks are undertaken and “definitions of the
situation” crystallize (Lawler 1992, 1997). Because of this, positive emo-
tions are attributed to the local unit, while negative emotions are attrib-
uted to the larger, more distant social unit. Applied to the four different
exchange structures (fig. 2), one would expect exchange relations to be
stronger objects of attachment in direct exchange structures (negotiated
and reciprocal) than in productive or indirect structures. The interactional,
person-to-person tie is more salient in direct exchange, whereas in pro-
ductive and indirect exchange, the person-to-group tie is more salient (see
also Lawler et al. 2000). In the former, positive emotions are attributed
to relations within the network (relational attributions), and in the latter,
they are attributed to the larger social unit (group attributions). This
reasoning implies the following proposition:
Proposition 12.—Structures of direct exchange produce relational at-
tributions rather than group attributions for emotions, whereas structures
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of productive or indirect exchange produce group rather than relational
attributions.
Overall, the affect theory of exchange shows how emotional processes
enhance or diminish the role of networks as a foundation for microsocial
order. The theory argues that if networks are perceived by actors as a
means for them to accomplish results that cannot be accomplished alone
or in subunits, the conditions for group attributions to the network are
present. The interweaving of self-efficacy with collective efficacy is fun-
damental. If, at the network level, there is a joint task that people come
to see as such, then the processes articulated in propositions 1 and 2 should
be activated, that is, nonseparability and perceptions of shared respon-
sibility. If, at the network level, a particular form of exchange is occurring,
then propositions 3–5 are applicable. Productive exchange at the network
level would produce the strongest solidarity effects. Thus, the affect theory
of social exchange offers testable implications for the conditions under
which networks become real for actors, are objects of emotional attach-
ment in their own right and a basis for person-to-group ties that buttress
social order and solidarity.
CONCLUSION
The actors assumed by sociological exchange theory are unemotional,
instrumental, information-processors, who respond to and anticipate fu-
ture rewards and punishments. The affect theory of social exchange in-
troduces an emoting actor, specifically, an actor who responds emotionally
to exchange and who attempts to understand the source of their emotions
and feelings. The theory draws particular attention to the joint activity
entailed in social exchange and to the emotional responses to success or
failure at that joint activity. A jointness-to-emotion process is the basis
for explaining how and why different structures or forms of exchange
generate varying degrees of order and solidarity. The theoretical argument
contains five general claims, as follows:
The emotions produced by exchange are involuntary, internal responses.
These emotions are felt as a “buzz” from accomplishing or not accom-
plishing an exchange task (i.e., as general feelings of pleasantness or un-
pleasantness). These feelings are a distinct class or type of reward (or
punishment), and as such, actors are motivated to reproduce positive and
avoid negative emotions in the future.
Actors engage in cognitive-interpretive work to understand what in the
social situation produces their feelings. The affect theory of social
exchange predicts that actors will attribute their exchange-based emotions
to social units—relations, networks, groups—to the degree that the
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exchange brings them together around a common endeavor, renders their
individual efforts or contributions indistinguishable (nonseparability), and
creates a sense of shared responsibility for success or failure at exchange.
Exchange structures (negotiated, reciprocal, productive, generalized) de-
termine the extent to which individual contributions to the task are non-
separable and the extent to which exchange fosters a sense of shared
responsibility. In this context, the theory predicts that productive struc-
tures produce stronger social-unit attributions of emotion than negotiated
or reciprocal structures, which, in turn, produce stronger social-unit at-
tributions than generalized structures of exchange.
Exchange structures have an impact on relational or group solidarity
through these emotional attributions and resulting affective attachments.
Affective attachments to a social unit are formed especially when social
units are perceived as stable and controllable causes of feelings such as
pleasantness, pride, and gratitude; affective detachments occur when those
social units are stable and uncontrollable causes of negative feelings (i.e.,
unpleasantness, shame, anger). In the theory, affective attachments are
the proximal cause of behavior oriented toward the collective good, and
affective detachments are the proximal cause of individually oriented
behavior. Productive exchange produces the strongest affective attach-
ments, generalized exchange the weakest, and negotiated and reciprocal
exchange are in between.
Through the emotional/affective processes of the theory, networks can
develop group properties. Specifically, a network, in which a given relation
encourages relations to other available members of the network (positively
connected network), tends to become a source of social similarity and
common identity. A network that encourages cliques or pockets of denser
relational ties (negatively connected network) tends to become a loosely
connected set of subgroups, each promoting a stronger source of common
identity than the larger unit. The affect theory predicts that, all things
being equal, networks of negotiated and reciprocal exchange will tend to
promote stronger relational ties within, whereas productive or generalized
exchange will promote stronger network or group-level ties.
The affect theory of social exchange has broad implications for the role
of emotions in the production of group solidarity (see also Collins 1981,
1989), because any social interaction entails a joint activity and an implicit,
if not explicit, task. If the interaction is successfully accomplished and
generates a positive result for actors, they are likely to feel good. This
will motivate each to interact with the same others in the future, expecting
another enjoyable result. With repetition, their relationship to each other
or a larger group membership becomes salient as an object outside them-
selves (see also Berger and Luckmann 1966) and a target for the emotion
experienced in interaction. A social network, by promoting repeated in-
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teractions among the same set of actors, could generate a group identity
that binds together the actors in the network and distinguishes them from
others. Thus, principles of the affect theory of social exchange can be
extended to other forms of social interaction and, more generally, to social
networks.
To conclude, social exchange has an instrumental foundation because
people seek and form exchanges in order to receive individual benefits
that they do not believe can be acquired elsewhere. My affect theory of
exchange shows how the instrumental conditions of exchange foster ex-
pressive relations and groups through an emotional/affective process. In
the theory, emotions are nonrational and outside the boundaries of rational
choice in two respects: (1) emotions are involuntary, internal responses
that simply “happen to people” (Hochschild 1979), and (2) emotions and
the attribution processes they trigger transform relations, networks, or
groups into expressive objects—that is, into a source of value. Emotional/
affective processes essentially move actors from the first (nonrational)
point to the second (nonrational) point, but do so through a rational
process; the actors’ goal to reproduce pleasant feelings and avoid un-
pleasant ones motivates their linking of these nonrational states. In a
larger sense, the affect theory of social exchange identifies some funda-
mental ways in which the rational and nonrational are intertwined in
exchange processes and reveals implications for the solidarity of exchange
relations and networks.
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